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Abstract 
In this article, we extend strategic human resource management (SHRM) thinking to 
theory and research on high reliability organizations (HROs) using a behavioral approach.  After 
considering the viability of reliability as an organizational performance indicator, we identify a set 
of eight reliability-oriented employee behaviors (ROEBs) likely to foster organizational reliability 
and suggest that they are especially valuable to reliability seeking organizations that operate 
under “trying conditions”.  We then develop a reliability-enhancing human resource strategy 
(REHRS) likely to facilitate the manifestation of these ROEBs.  We conclude that the behavioral 
approach offers SHRM scholars an opportunity to explain how people contribute to specific 
organizational goals in specific contexts and, in turn, to identify human resource strategies that 
extend the general high performance human resource strategy (HPHRS) in new and important 
ways.  
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Toward A Strategic Human Resource Management Model 
Of High Reliability Organization Performance  
 
Strategic human resource management (SHRM) is concerned with the contributions 
human resource strategies make to organizational effectiveness, and the ways in which these 
contributions are achieved.   While theory and research have addressed both issues, much of 
the initial work focused on the former.  This consisted primarily of large-scale survey studies in 
which various measures of human resource activities or programs on the one hand were 
statistically related to one or more measures of firm financial performance (e.g., return on 
investment, return on assets, and stock values) on the other (for recent reviews see Boxall & 
Purcell, 2000 and Delery & Shaw, 2001).  Although plagued by some rather serious conceptual 
and methodological shortcomings, collectively these studies produced results credible and 
positive enough to keep SHRM scholars intrigued and pushing forward (Wright & Gardner, 
2002). 
Over time, as the field’s focus has shifted from “show what” to “show how” (Dyer & 
Shafer, 1999), SHRM scholars adopted a contingency (or occasionally configurational) 
perspective, leading theorists and researchers into the domain of fit, or alignment.  Here, fit 
comes in two forms.  One is vertical, or the degree of alignment between (a) components of a 
firm’s human resource strategy and (b) core features of its business strategy.  The other is 
horizontal fit, or the degree of alignment among components of a firm’s business strategy 
(typically activities or programs such as selection, training, and compensation).  Conceptually, 
the two notions of fit have been used to derive normative models to show how intuitively derived 
typologies of human resource strategy should be paired with similarly derived typologies of 
business strategy to maximize firm performance (e.g., Dyer & Holder, 1988).  Empirically, the 
contingency (or configurational) perspective has informed a series of empirical studies designed 
to determine whether business units that had achieved vertical and horizontal fit performed 
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better than those that had not (e.g., Arthur, 1992; Delery & Doty, 1996; Ichniowski, Shaw & 
Prennushi, 1997; MacDuffie, 1995; Youndt, Snell, Dean & Lepak, 1996).   In general, these 
studies have produced, at best, mixed support (Wright & Sherman, 1999).  As a result some 
SHRM scholars have come to advocate a universalistic or “best practice” approach to human 
resource strategy; that is, to argue that a single high performance human resource strategy 
(HPHRS) enhances organizational effectiveness regardless of organizational goals, work 
systems, or context (Becker & Huselid, 1998; Pfeffer, 1998).     
Before definitive conclusions can be drawn, however, it is necessary to more fully 
explore the features and dynamics (e.g., employee behavioral patterns) occurring in the so-
called “black box” between human resource activities and programs on the one hand and 
indicators of firm competitiveness and performance on the other (Becker & Gerhart, 1996).  
Early SHRM scholars, for example, suggest that certain organizational goals require certain 
employee behaviors and that certain human resource strategies produce certain employee 
behaviors, and that the task of the human resource strategist is to uncover and test these 
linkages (Cappelli & Singh, 1992; Schuler & Jackson, 1987; see also Delery & Shaw, 2001).  
This so-called behavioral approach to SHRM is conceptually appealing.  It suggests that the 
extent to which a human resource strategy contributes to organizational performance depends 
(i.e., is contingent) on its capacity to foster desired employee behaviors.  Despite its appeal, the 
behavioral approach has only rarely been employed (Delery & Shaw, 2001; Wright & Sherman, 
1999; for an exception see Dyer & Shafer, 1999, 2003).  Thus, an opportunity exists to develop 
SHRM models using a behavioral approach.     
Here we pursue this opportunity by taking a closer look at high reliability organizations 
(HROs).  HROs strive to achieve virtually problem free performance under the most trying of 
circumstances.  Examples of HROs include nuclear power generation plants, naval aircraft 
carriers, air traffic control systems, and hospital emergency centers.  HROs provide a good 
setting in which to develop a behavioral model of SHRM for five reasons.  First, their 
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organizational goals are both unique and quite clear: to avoid disasters, breakdowns, errors, 
and the like.  Second, prior HRO research suggests that people play a crucial role in helping 
organizations to achieve high reliability performance.  Or, put in the negative, that inappropriate 
employee behavior tends to be a common cause of organizational failure. (Roberts and Bea 
[2001a], for example, note that as many as 80 percent of organizational failures involve 
misdirected employee action.)  Third, the HRO literature is filled with case studies and other 
analyses that make it possible to extract an initial set of employee behaviors likely to foster high 
reliability.  Fourth, HRO theory and research strongly suggests that context matters; in 
particular, that the presence of trying conditions (the complexity of the system, high levels of 
interdependence between and among people and technology, and external volatility) requires 
organizing systems (and, thus, employee behaviors) that differ substantially from those used in 
more stable settings.  Finally, although no one to our knowledge has considered what an 
appropriate human resource strategy for HROs might look like, the HRO literature suffers no 
shortage of potential insights. 
In this article we present a SHRM-based model of HRO performance that is simple and 
straightforward (see Figure 1).  Nonetheless, we believe that our analysis contributes to the 
ongoing SHRM conversation in four ways.  First, we point to organizational reliability as an 
ideal, system-level, employee-driven measure of firm performance that is absolutely critical for 
particular set of organizations.  Second, we identify a set of reliability-oriented employee 
behaviors (ROEBs) likely to foster organizational reliability.  These behaviors complement 
existing SHRM efforts to illuminate the “black box” using a behavioral approach.  They also are 
HRO specific in the sense that they are likely to be more valuable for firms focused on reliability 
than for firms pursuing other performance outcomes.  Third, we underscore the contingent 
nature of employee behavior by suggesting that ROEBs are more important for firms operating 
under trying conditions than for those working in more stable environments.  We suggest that 
desirable employee behaviors depend not only on organizational goals but also on the 
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environments in which firms operate.  The implication of this argument, if true, is that future 
SHRM theory and research would benefit more from deeper and richer explorations into the 
settings and circumstances in which certain employee behaviors enhance organizational 
performance.  Finally, we develop a set of human resource management principles likely to 
facilitate the manifestation of reliability-oriented behaviors.  The reliability enhancing human 
resource strategy (REHRS) we present focuses on the organizing systems HROs use and, thus, 
(a) includes aspects of organizational infrastructure (i.e., organizational structure, technology, 
and processes) as well as human resource principles and activities, (b) emphasizes principles, 
and (c) is quite specific with respect to infrastructure features and human resource activities that 
comprise each principle.  We suggest, therefore, that the REHRS is likely to be more beneficial 
for firms pursing reliability under trying conditions than is a more generic form of the HPHRS.   
 Much SHRM theorizing begins with human resource strategy and then progressively 
works out toward firm performance.  Employing a behavioral approach, of course, requires 
executing the pattern in reverse.  The remainder of this article is thus organized as follows.  We 
begin by discussing the viability of reliability as a performance indicator.  Next, we identify a set 
of eight ROEBs that extant HRO theory and research suggest are critical antecedents of 
organizational reliability.  Then, we consider the extent to which the relationship between 
ROEBs and organizational reliability is moderated by trying conditions.  Finally, we develop six 
REHRS principles based on prior HRO and SHRM theory and research and assess them for 
vertical and horizontal fit. 
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Figure 1 
 
Toward a SHRM Model of HRO Performance 
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High Reliability Performance 
Conceptualizing organizational reliability has historically been a controversial matter 
within the HRO literature.  While few disagreed that reliability refers to an organization’s  
“capacity to produce collective outcomes of a certain minimum quality repeatedly” (Hannan & 
Freeman, 1984: 153), opinions bifurcated from there.  Students of normal accident theory 
(NAT), on the one hand, suggested that there is no such thing as a reliable organization; that 
the question isn’t whether reliability seeking organizations will fail, but rather when (e.g., Perrow, 
1984).   Students of HROs, one the other hand, argued it is possible for organizations to 
continually delay or even permanently defer the inevitable failures through effective organization 
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(e.g., Roberts, 1990).  Fortunately, “recent research on high reliability has moved beyond these 
extreme positions.  It has embraced the idea of ‘higher reliability’ as a performance variable 
rather than reliability as a defining characteristic” (Schulman, 2001: 346; see also Creed, Stout, 
& Roberts, 1993).  But, while the notion of higher reliability is now theoretically justifiable, it has 
largely remained empirically under-explored.  Investigations into organizational reliability 
primarily consist of case studies that examine the antecedents of effective action (e.g., Bigley & 
Roberts, 2001; Roberts, 1990; Roberts, Stout, & Halpern, 1994; Weick & Roberts, 1993) or 
catastrophic failure (e.g., Perrow, 1984; Shrivastava, 1987; Vaughan, 1996; Weick, 1990, 1993) 
in reliability seeking organizations.  While clearly insightful, these efforts treat reliability as a 
binary (success or failure) concept.  The problem, according to Schulman (2001: 347), is that 
too much reliance on single case studies leads to “a danger of falling victim to a kind of 
evolutionary optimism that infers that because features have evolved in an organization that is 
surviving in a high-reliability niche, these features must contribute to its overall reliability”.  
Aggregating findings across case studies is difficult because one quickly runs into the problem 
of too many variables and too few cases.   
Operationalizing organizational performance has not been easy for SHRM scholars 
either.  Firm-level performance indicators such as profitability (e.g., ROI and ROA), sales 
growth, and stock market value (e.g., Tobin’s Q) have been most common despite their 
conceptual distance from human action.  As a result, some have accused SHRM researchers of 
selecting performance measures on the basis of empirical convenience over conceptual veracity 
(Rogers & Wright, 1998); others have called for future research to focus on intermediate, 
process-related performance measures that indicate how financial results are achieved (Becker 
& Gerhart, 1996: 793); still others point to “a crying need for a few carefully selected, 
qualitatively oriented, intensive case studies to help clarify the nature of the variables and 
relationships” (Dyer & Shafer, 2003: 8). 
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Both the SHRM and HRO literatures would thus stand to benefit from a merging in 
thinking.  The HRO literature could gain from theory-building exercises that treat reliability as 
relative and comparative and that summarize findings across the case studies and ready them 
for empirical test.  SHRM theory and research, in turn, could profit from efforts that focus on 
organizational reliability as a critical process-based, yet theoretically driven, measure of 
organizational performance and that leverage the HRO literature’s extensive case studies into 
how HROs’ people contribute to high reliability.  Attention now turns to the task of identifying 
these ROEBs.   
Reliability-Oriented Employee Behavior 
HRO research, conducted as it is by organization theorists, tends to focus on 
organizational structures, processes, and technologies (i.e., infrastructure) and employee 
mindsets as they key antecedents of high reliability performance.  While numerous studies of 
organizational reliability suggest that employee behaviors often play a critical mediating role in 
the relationship between organizational infrastructure and employee mindset and organizational 
reliability, extant treatments of employee behaviors tend to be secondary, sporadic, and widely 
dispersed.  Consider, for example, Weick’s (1988) analysis of the gas leak at Union Carbide’s 
Bhopal plant (see also Shrivasta, 1987).  In the article, Weick points to decreased slack (i.e., 
organizational cost cutting efforts that led to lower facility maintenance and diligence) as the key 
cause of the disaster; hence, he concludes that “[a]s slack decreases, the technology becomes 
more complex, which means there are more places where a minor lapse can escalate just when 
there are more minor lapses occurring” (Weick, 1988: 313).   But, what actually constituted 
“decreased slack” at the Bhopal plant?  Weick, in passing, points to employee behaviors: to wit, 
“increased inattention, indifference, turnover, low cost improvisation, and working-to-rule” 
(1988:313).  A behavioral approach to high reliability performance, of course, would involve 
paying significantly more attention to such ROEBs.  Thus, a SHRM scholar examining Weick’s 
analysis of the Bhopal case would likely conclude that ROEBs mediate the relationship between 
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organizational infrastructure and organizational reliability.  Or, more specifically, that decreased 
organizational slack reduces the quantity or quality of ROEBs (e.g., ascertaining and 
improvising) that foster reliable performance. 
Despite the prominence of the behavioral approach in SHRM thinking, few empirical 
efforts have explicitly tested the mediating role of employee behaviors (Delery & Shaw, 2001; 
Wright & Sherman, 1999).  Further, many of the behaviorally based theoretical models designed 
to guide future empirical efforts begin with human resource strategy and thus point to rather 
general employee behaviors such as turnover, pro-social, citizenship, effort, and so forth.  On 
the positive side, such general behaviors are likely to lead to universal findings (i.e., 
commitment, citizenship, effort and the like foster organizational performance in many different 
organizational contexts – i.e., high technology start-ups, factories, etc. – and across many 
different organizational goals – i.e., growth, quality, productivity, etc.).  The downside to such 
approaches, however, is that general behaviors, while perhaps necessary, are unlikely to be 
sufficient for many organizational goals.   
 As noted earlier, prior HRO case studies offer a good source in which to identify specific 
employee behaviors that drive a specific type of organizational performance.  In the remainder 
of this section, then, we discuss eight ROEBs that the HRO literature suggests are crucial for 
reliable performance and organize them into four categories based on the underlying 
organizational capability involved. 
 
Diligence 
Diligence refers to an organization’s capacity to anticipate or detect surprises early and 
without compromising routine operations.  The goal is, at best, to foresee and forestall problems 
before they emerge or, at worst, to detect and locate problems quickly enough to act before they 
escalate.  HROs are thus often described as being ever “thoughtful’, “heedful”, and “mindful” of 
the unexpected (Weick, Sutcliffe & Obstfeld, 1999; Weick & Roberts, 1993), their systems and 
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people characterized as being more careful, critical, consistent, purposeful, attentive, studious, 
vigilant, and conscientious than are those of a typical organization (Roberts & Bea, 2001a: 182).  
Such hyper-vigilance is, at least in part, the result of employees that continuously and effectively 
ascertain and communicate.   
Ascertain.  People in HROs are chronically on the lookout for the unexpected.  They 
actively monitor and challenge each other’s actions and thought processes to keep problems 
from occurring in the first place (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001).  They continually anticipate and detect 
a large number and variety of problems, errors, failures, and surprises (Bierly & Spender, 1995).  
As a result, perhaps counterintuitively, they make fewer mistakes and yet identify more 
problems than do less attentive workforces (Edmondson, 1996).   
Communicate.  People in HROs also communicate more or less continuously because 
they implicitly recognize that a direct relationship exists between the quantity of communication 
and reliable performance (LaPorte & Consolini, 1993).  They strive to avoid distortions and 
misunderstandings by conversing and corresponding a direct, clear, precise, and accurate 
manner.  They report problems or failures immediately and candidly (Weick et. al., 1999).  
Finally, they go to great lengths to avoid what Weick (1990) refers to as “pluralistic ignorance” in 
which individuals are puzzled by what’s going on but assume that no one else is.  They never 
take for granted, for example, that they alone have lingering doubts about the wisdom of 
launching the Challenger space shuttle as scheduled (Vaughan, 1996), or that the captain 
realizes that another airplane is sitting in a dense cloud in the middle of his takeoff runway 
(Weick, 1990).   
 
Facileness 
When the unexpected strikes, HROs are facile in the sense that they are capable of 
quickly and easily switching from stable and routine activity to flexible and novel action and then 
back again.  HROs immediately trigger substitute structures that forestall paralysis and panic 
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and facilitate the bringing of problems under control.  Often times, these alternate structures are 
slightly modified versions of well-planned and practiced response tactics (Bigley & Roberts, 
2001).  Other times, they represent almost wholly emergent processes (Bourrier, 1996; Rochlin, 
1989).  In either case, facileness requires people to initiate and deploy, to know when and how 
to switch from one mode of organizing to the other.   
Initiate.  People in HROs initiate appropriate action to mitigate and rectify unexpected 
events.  They take responsibility for problems (Weick et. al., 1999).  When they get into 
situations they don’t understand, they ask for help; they admit that they are in over their heads 
and they enlist outside assistance (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001).  Finally, when necessary, they “call 
foul”, shut down the system to keep problems from growing and escalating, and then mobilize 
an appropriate response (Roberts, 1990; Roberts, et. al., 1994).   
Deploy.  People in HROs also rapidly deploy.  They switch tasks and roles with minimal 
time and effort so that help arrives where and when it is needed.  They organize into ad hoc 
action groups and then dissolve as soon as the crisis is over (Rochlin, 1989).  As a result, 
organizational expertise is rapidly pooled and mobilized around events that are impossible to 
anticipate.   
 
Fluidity 
Once organizational response tactics have been triggered and critical resources 
mobilized, HROs are remarkably fluid.  That is, they exhibit the capacity to operate effectively in 
chaotic situations where traditional order has collapsed.  This is no small thing.  Many disasters 
have resulted from small system failures that amplify because human interaction breaks down in 
the ensuing chaos and people act less like a collective force and more like independent 
strangers (Weick, 1993; Reason, 1997; Shrivasta, 1987).  People in HROs, by contrast, are 
collectively at their best in a crisis because they thrive when spontaneously coacting and 
improvising to face down emergencies (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001).    
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Coact.  Novel and complex problems require people with diverse talents and 
perspectives to coact or spontaneously collaborate -- to collectively attack the issues at hand 
with minimal wasted time and effort.  Thus, people in HROs closely interact with one another to 
generate hypotheses about what’s going on, to determine what should be done, and to 
coordinate action (Schulman, 1993: 43).  They allow influence and authority to migrate toward 
expertise and experience no matter where it lies within the hierarchy (Bigley & Roberts, 2001).  
The result is that they are better at applying the organizational knowledge necessary to mitigate 
problems. 
Improvise.  Unexpected events rarely conform to preexisting solution sets.  Thus, when 
faced with a crisis, people in HROs avoid mindlessly using existing policies and procedures (i.e., 
working to rule) unless they are certain of their applicability (Weick, 1990; Weick & Sutcliffe, 
2001).  Instead, they improvise.  They accomplish novel tasks through the creative use of 
available resources to reduce the time between discovery and execution to close to zero.  They 
quickly and easily change performance strategies and modify or switch tactics (Bigley & 
Roberts, 2001).  In short, people in HROs regularly develop innovative solutions to puzzling and 
complex problems on-the-fly. 
 
Generativeness 
Finally, HROs strive to become more diligent, more facile, and more fluid over time.  
They are, in effect, learning organizations.  Since trial-and error learning is out of the question, 
HROs work to squeeze as much new knowledge as possible out of their successes and failures 
as well as the experiences of others (Haunschild & Sullivan, 2002).  Organizational learning is 
stifled when people become overconfident or complacent (Starbuck & Milliken, 1988).  Thus, 
HROs seek to create a workforce that is collectively curious and open to new insights, one 
comprised of people that are always learning and educating. 
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Learn.  People in HROs continuously strive to go deeper and wider in their skills and 
understandings.  They “over learn” critical tasks to offset the tendency for those skills to unravel 
under pressure (Weick, 1990: 590).  They pursue the attainment of proficiency in multiple 
competency domains.  People in HROs are also tenacious about learning from the past.  They 
view every incident, no matter how small, as an opportunity to learn something valuable for the 
future.  They dig deeply to locate the root causes of past problems and are suspicious of simple, 
surface level explanations.  They realize that opportunity for learning from experience 
diminishes rapidly as time elapses, so they conduct formal or informal incident assessments 
immediately (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001).   
Educate.  People in HROs also take responsibility for each other’s learning by openly 
sharing information and knowledge with colleagues both inside and across departmental 
boundaries.  This knowledge sharing often occurs on the spot: when people in HROs have an 
insight, they stop what they are doing and spontaneously convene people to share the 
discovery (Schulman, 1993).   
Taken together, the eight ROEBs discussed above comprise a highly interdependent 
set.  They are complementary in that when people exhibit more (less) of any one of them, they 
increase (decrease) the returns of demonstrating the others.  For example, “when people bring 
new variables under their control and enlarge their ability to act on them, they also enlarge the 
range of issues they can notice... Conversely, if people are blocked from acting on hazards, it is 
not long before their ‘useless’ observations of those hazards are also ignored or denied, and 
errors accumulate unnoticed” (Weick, et. al., 1999: 90).  Further, the relationship between 
ROEBs and organizational reliability should be clear.  ROEBs, to a large extent, comprise an 
organization’s capacity (a) to anticipate or detect surprises early without compromising routine 
operations (i.e., ascertain and communicate), (b) to switch from stable and routine activity to 
flexible and novel action and then back again quickly (i.e., initiate and deploy), (c) to operate 
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effectively in chaotic situations (i.e., coact and improvise), and (d) to get increasingly diligent, 
facile, and fluid over time (i.e., learn and educate).  Thus, it can be postulated that:   
Proposition 1: ROEBs will be positively related to organizational reliability.  The 
better a reliability seeking organization’s employees are at ascertaining, 
communicating, initiating, deploying, coacting, improvising, learning, and 
educating, the more reliable that organization’s performance.   
 
Trying Conditions 
Theory and research on reliability seeking organizations generally assumes that the 
organizations in question operate under “trying conditions” (Weick et al., 1999).  That is, they 
manage highly complex and interdependent systems that are subject to substantial external 
volatility.  Consider, for example, the case of nuclear aircraft carriers as described in Roberts 
(1990) and Weick and Roberts (1993).  These organizations (a) operate between two and eight 
nuclear reactors (which generate enough power to meet the needs of a city the size of 
Minneapolis), monitor over a billion electronic components, and use technical manuals that, if 
stacked, would be as high as the Washington Monument (i.e., their systems are complex); (b) 
require twenty real-time communication devices between the ship’s control tower and the rest of 
the units to coordinate the simultaneous taking off and landing of aircraft (i.e., their tasks and 
routines are interdependent); and (c) experience dramatic changes in the weather as well as the 
(potential) unexpected actions of the “enemy” (i.e., their external environments are volatile).     
Trying conditions are important contextual factors because collectively they trigger and 
magnify three types of organizational failure that are difficult to prevent, anticipate, and fix.  First, 
trying conditions increase the likelihood of a so-called “normal” disasters in which single 
problems lead to chain reactions that reverberate through the system and trigger a cascade of 
malfunctions and breakdowns (Perrow, 1984).  Second, trying conditions are associated with 
failures of foresight in which organizations are blindsided by unexpected (and often 
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inconceivable) changes in their external environments (Weick, 1993).  Finally, trying conditions 
lead to quantity failures in which normally mundane events overaccumulate to such an extent 
that they collectively overwhelm the capacity of the system and lead to a rapid deterioration of 
performance and, eventually, catastrophe (Rudolph & Repenning, 2002).  Of course, attaining 
reliability under trying conditions is made even more difficult when one realizes that crises rarely 
limit themselves to single failure type (Rudolph & Repenning, 2002: 27).   
Organizations’ relative susceptibility to these types of failures, in turn, has important 
implications for the value of ROEBs.  As noted earlier, prior HRO theory and research suggest 
that when the potential for catastrophic failure is high (i.e., organizations operate under trying 
conditions), then organizational reliability is enhanced when people are diligent, facile, fluid, and 
generative.  But, it stands to reason that as work conditions become less trying, and thus the 
risks of failure recede, so too should the value of ROEBs.  Reliability seeking organizations that 
execute simple and straightforward tasks under stable conditions are capable of designing more 
or less foolproof processes and planning for virtually all contingencies in advance.  As a result, 
the effectiveness of such systems is less likely to depend on peoples’ capacities to identify a 
wide range of potential threats (ascertain), to manage hand-offs and interdependence 
(communicate), to take appropriate action to mitigate and rectify unexpected events (initiate), to 
switch tasks and role quickly and easily (deploy), to spontaneously engage unfamiliar 
colleagues (coact), to perform non-routine actions on-the-fly (improvise), to have deep and wide 
understanding of the system (learn), and to share knowledge both within and across units 
(educate).   
In sum, then, the HRO literature argues that context moderates the relationship between 
system design and performance.  When considered from an employee behavior perspective, 
this means that organizations operating under trying conditions should require more and/or 
greater quality ROEBs than do organization operating systems in predictable and stable 
settings.  Indeed, it is possible that organizations operating under less trying conditions achieve 
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high levels of reliability through a modified, or even a completely different, set of employee 
behaviors.  In either case, though, it can be suggested that: 
Proposition 2: Trying conditions moderate the relationship between ROEBs and 
organizational reliability.  The more complex, more interdependent, and more 
volatile the operating conditions, the stronger the relationship between ROEBS 
and organizational reliability.     
 
Reliability-Enhancing Human Resource Strategy  
Now that we have identified a set of reliability-oriented employee behaviors and 
delineated the contextual conditions under which they are likely to be most effective, the next 
question is, what human resource strategy best brings them about? 
HRO theory and research is relatively silent here since little attention has been 
specifically devoted to human resource management issues.  As noted earlier, though, HRO 
scholars do point to many organizational infrastructure features and employee mindset shaping 
activities that likely influence performance through employee behaviors.  Recall, for example, 
that Weick (1988) suggested that carrying some human resource slack or redundancy positively 
affects people’s willingness and ability to ascertain and improvise.  Further, the closer one gets 
to HRO practice, the more human resource management activities are discussed as key 
mechanisms that organizations can use to foster higher reliability.  Weick and Sutcliffe 
(2001:57), for instance, suggest that HROs “put premium on recruiting and selection 
processes”.  Roberts and Bea (2001a: 72) note that “HROs spend disproportionately more 
money than other organizations training people”.   
From a SHRM perspective, the discussion of human resource strategy begins with the 
HPHRS.  But, defining and specifying the HPHRS is not easy (Becker & Gerhart, 1996; Dyer & 
Reeves, 1995).  This is, in part, because the HPHRS refers to two distinct, yet blurred, streams 
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of human resource strategy research: high performance work systems (HPWSs) and “best 
practices” (see Table 1).   
 
Table 1 
 
High Performance Human Resource Strategy 
 
  
HPWS 
HPHRS 
“Best Practices” 
 
REHRS 
Focus Organizing system HR management Organizing System 
Emphasis  HR principles HR activities HR principle 
Specificity  High  Low High 
 
 
The HPWS stream, at its name implies, focuses on organizing systems: in particular, 
production systems (Appelbaum, Bailey, Berg, & Kalleberg, 2000).  Rooted in socio-technical 
systems theory, HPWS research digs deeply into interrelationships among people, process, and 
technology.  Early work, for instance, emphasizes the “organizational logic” in favor of matching 
HPWSs to flexible production systems and control-oriented human resource strategies to 
classic mass production approaches (MacDuffie, 1995).  Since the focus is on the organizing 
system, the HPWS stream also tends to emphasize human resource strategy principles -- 
general themes that theoretically guide the selection and grouping of human resource activities 
– rather than just the human resource activities themselves.  For example, a HPWS has come 
to refer to (a) increasing workforce skill levels, (b) providing employees discretion and 
opportunity to use their skills in collaboration with other workers, and (c) offering an incentive 
structure that enhances motivation and commitment (Batt, 2002: 587).  It’s not that HPWS 
scholars are not interested human resource activities though.  Rather, HPWS research tends to 
assess each principle with human resource activities that are highly specific to the work system.  
For example, Batt’s (2002) examination of call centers included items capturing the extent to 
which employees can control the pace with which they can answer phones, are allowed to 
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handle nonroutine service requests themselves, and are subject to extensive electronic 
monitoring.  Thus, HPWS research can be characterized as focusing on the work system 
performance, emphasizing human resource management principles, and greatly specifying 
human resource activities.  
“Best practice” research, on the other hand, refers to large scale cross industry studies 
that relate one or more human resource activities on the one hand to one or more measures of 
organizational effectiveness on the other hand.  This stream’s roots can be traced to functional 
human resource activity studies that extend individual level findings (e.g., the relationship 
between compensation practices and employee effort and persistence) to the firm level (e.g., 
the relationship between compensation practices and firm performance).  Here the focus is on 
human resource management, not organizing systems.  Further, the emphasis is on human 
resource activities rather than principles in that researchers usually begin with a set of human 
resource activities and then aggregate up to principles (usually through factor analysis) rather 
than the other way around.  Further, because the focus in at the firm level, “best practice” 
research tends to be more general in its treatment of human resource activities.  (A question 
about the percentage of work performance of the typical employee that is electronically 
monitored, for example, is clearly relevant to work systems than to a randomly selected cross 
section of firms.)   Thus, “best practice” research involves focusing on human resource 
management, emphasizing HR activities, and doing so at a fairly general level.   
The HPWS and “best practices” streams have merged over time into what can be 
referred to as a HPHRS.  This integration is the result of at least two factors.  First, HPWS 
research has generally found that enhancing workforce competence, expanding employee 
discretion and participation, and bolstering employee commitment and motivation result in 
greater performance regardless of work system employed (Appelbaum et. al., 2000; Ichniowski, 
Kochan, Levine, Olson, & Strauss, 1996).  Thus, in a practical sense, the human resource 
activities that comprise these three principles are “best practices” across the sample of firms 
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studied.  Second, the human resource activities that comprise a HPWS are very similar to those 
found to be crucial to firm performance by researchers in the “best practice” stream.   Both 
streams, for example, would agree that performance is likely enhanced by employment security, 
selective hiring of new personnel, self-managed teams and decentralization of decision making, 
comparatively high compensation contingent on organizational performance, extensive training, 
reduced status distinctions across organizational levels, and the sharing of financial and 
performance information throughout the organization (Pfeffer, 1998).  Clearly, then, unless there 
is reason to believe otherwise, one would expect these best practices to be positively related to 
HRO performance.  But, as the preceding discussion suggests, identifying a human resource 
strategy for HROs (even a HPHRS) requires also making some choices about focus, emphasis, 
and specificity.     
Like the HPWS stream, our focus here is on the organizing systems that HROs use to 
foster reliability.  After all, HRO theory and research emphasizes the structures, processes, and 
technologies that HROs use to avoid or permanently delay failures.  HRO scholars also stress 
the fact that the systems employed by reliability seeking organizations operating under trying 
conditions are markedly different from those used by traditional efficiency seeking organizations 
that operate in more stable and predictable environments (Weick et. al., 1999; Weick & Roberts, 
1993; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001).  If this is true, then it naturally follows that the performance 
enhancing human resource strategies that HROs use should be (somewhat to quite) different 
from those identified by HPWS literature.  One important issue, though, is how to handle these 
infrastructure features.  The HPWS literature, it will be recalled, tends to separate human 
resource strategy from organizational infrastructure and then looks to see whether firms that 
match their human resource strategies to their organizational infrastructures perform better than 
do those that do not.  A behavioral approach, though, favors beginning with a set of critical 
employee behaviors (i.e., ROEBs) and then moving back to identify broad principles comprised 
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of both infrastructure features and human resource management activities likely to bring them 
about.  
Consistent with a systems focus, we also elect to emphasize human resource strategy 
principles over human resource activities.  As systems level constructs, principles are more 
logically related to systems level outcomes (e.g., it makes more sense that “expanding 
employee discretion and participation” would be related to high reliability than would “the 
percentage of employees that participate in off-line problem solving groups”).  As a result, 
SHRM scholars increasingly suggest that human resource strategy be conceptualized at the 
principle rather than the activity level of analysis (Becker & Gerhart, 1996; Dyer & Shafer, 1999, 
2003; Wright, 1998).  Further, principles are more condusive to the assessment of vertical and 
horizontal fit than activities are since they allow for the determination (conceptually or 
empirically) of whether (a) the identified principles are individually necessary and collectively 
sufficient to engender the outcome of interest (ROEBs in this case) and (b) the various human 
resource activities that comprise the principles are mutually reinforcing, respectively.         
Finally, our unique context (HROs) and particular outcome emphasis (ROEBs) allows us 
to be quite specific with respect to infrastructure features and human resource activities.  Wright 
(1998) suggests that SHRM scholars need to pay close attention to the differences between 
human resource principles (e.g., pay for performance), practices (e.g., merit pay, bonuses, 
piece rates), particulars (e.g., competencies versus supervisor rankings as the basis for 
determining merit pay), and products (e.g., the exact performance that a supervisor rates 
employees on to determine their merit pay).  Wright (1998) also suggests that the more 
researchers able to get to the product level of assessment, the better their chances are for 
finding fit.   
In the remainder of this section, we leverage prior HRO and SHRM thinking to identify a 
system-driven, principle-based REHRS comprised of specific organizational infrastructure 
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features and human resource management activities.  Then, we conceptually assess the 
REHRS principles on the basis of their collective capacity to support vertical and horizontal fit.   
 
A Six Principle REHRS 
Principle 1: Embed an obsession for reliability.  HROs are hazardous and dangerous 
places where mistakes and surprises have catastrophic consequences for people, society, and 
the environment.  Despite well-known risks, however, many disastrous organizational failures 
can be traced back to individual decisions to compromise on reliability in favor of other (usually 
noble and important) objectives (Perrow, 1984; Shrivasta, 1987; Weick, 1988, 1990).  Thus, 
HROs do everything they can to avoid even the smallest lapses by embedding an obsession for 
reliability deep into the bowels of the organization (Weick et. al., 1999).   
To embed an obsession for reliability, HROs entrench reliability objectives into 
organizational missions, values, and performance metrics (Weick et. al., 1999).  They insure 
that virtually every piece of formal communication going to employees reinforces some aspect 
of reliability (Roberts & Bea, 2001a).  They reward and celebrate reliability way over and way 
above productivity or efficiency (Roberts & Bea, 2001b).  Finally, HROs select and promote 
people on the basis of their adherence to organizational mission and values (i.e., power hungry 
individualists need not apply) (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001).   
Principle 2: Promote contextual clarity.  Understanding that reliability is the 
uncontested organizational priority is not enough.  According to Weick and Sutcliffe (2001: 63), 
another “key to effective performance lies in maintaining situational awareness, the big picture 
of current operations, or in the language of aircraft carriers, having the bubble”.  HROs thus 
seek to promote contextual clarity.  That is, they work hard to ensure that employees can 
effectively integrate their local knowledge with the overall situational and operational status of 
the system and then extend their analysis forward in time to envision potential future 
implications.   
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To promote contextual clarity, HROs provide employees with lots of real-time operating 
information (e.g., situational assessments with continual updates) and ensure that they know 
what to do with it (Eisenhardt, 1993).  They develop early warning systems; these systems are 
often technology-driven but they also can take the form of guidelines or heuristics (Roberts, 
1990).  They employ communication protocols to facilitate the dissemination of information 
between individuals and across units (Weick et. al., 1999).  Finally, they train employees 
continuously in the physical and dynamic properties of the technical system to ensure that 
employees can effectively analyze both the upstream and downstream consequences of their 
actions (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001: 57). 
Principle 3: Foster reconfigurability.  Systems fail when they lack requisite variety; 
that is, when the scope and scale of unexpected events exceeds their range of potential 
solutions and repairs.  HROs, of course, operate in settings ripe for “normal” disasters, failures 
of foresight, and quantity-induced breakdowns; contexts where the inconceivable is not only 
possible but also likely.  To achieve resiliency in the face of such challenging demands, HROs 
foster reconfigurability.  They strive to develop people and infrastructures flexible enough not 
only to routinely handle a wide-range of unexpected events but also to effectively manage all 
remaining surprises through successful ad hoc action.   
To foster reconfigurability, HROs design contingency plans in advance and then provide 
employees lots of training and practice in using them (Bigley & Roberts, 2001).  They develop 
guidelines that specify when and how people should shut down the system, deploy additional 
resources, and/or trigger the alteration of structures (Weick & Roberts, 1993).  They 
underspecify and overstaff critical roles so that people have the flexibility and freedom 
necessary to quickly and easily act when it is necessary to do so (Weick et. al., 1999).  Finally, 
they push decision-making authority and the discretion to act down to the lowest possible levels 
(Weick, 1990). 
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Principle 4: Instill accountability.  HROs also work hard to ensure that irrespective of 
whether employees are executing routine tasks or responding to an emergency, they are always 
operating within the boundaries (and the best interests) of the system (Vaughan, 1999).  They 
consider even one case of “freelancing” to be one too many because they realize that such 
behaviors often create more problems than they solve (Bigley & Roberts, 2001).  HROs thus 
instill accountability by regularly asking employees to explain their conduct both formally and 
informally.    
To instill accountability throughout the system, HROs embed redundancy in the form of 
duplication and backups (Roberts, 1990).  They create clear lines of responsibility to ensure 
that, even though people are always watching one another’s backs, employees know where the 
“buck stops” (Roberts, Stout & Halpern, 1994).  They practice zero-tolerance for even small-
scale actions that compromise reliability or impair collective action.  Finally, HROs implement 
frequent and thorough performance management systems (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001).  
Principle 5: Facilitate development.  The road to disaster is often paved by 
complacency and obsolescence.  Thus, HROs strive to facilitate the continual development of 
their systems and people.  The goal is to ensure that the organization is constantly forcing, and 
then helping, people to know what they don’t know (Roberts & Bea, 2001a). 
To facilitate development, HROs regularly assess core processes and procedures and 
go to great lengths to avoid structural decoupling in which the procedures on the books look 
nothing like actual practice (Hynes & Prasad, 1997).  They are vigilant about using “incident 
review” processes where breakdowns (both small and large) and near misses are openly and 
honestly examined and, when necessary, rectified (Carroll, 1995, 1998; Haunschild & Sullivan, 
2002; Schulman, 1993).  They provide employees with lots of opportunities for new training, 
retraining, and cross training and they do so in forms that are friendly and easy to use (Weick & 
Sutcliffe, 2001).  Finally, they create communities of practice to allow people to develop in-depth 
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knowledge of particular topics and to share that knowledge with others across unit and 
organizational boundaries. 
Principle 6: Encourage security.  HROs are clearly not for everyone.  They employ 
people with highly specialized skills and then ask them to be diligent, facile, fluid, and generative 
under challenging and stressful circumstances.  On the other hand, employee turnover and 
hiring mistakes can lead to serious system disruption and even instability.  Thus, HROs work 
hard to encourage employment and psychological security.   
To encourage security, HROs formally and informally reward people for raising concerns 
and pointing out errors (Weick et. al., 1999).  They never punish, belittle, or make scapegoats 
out of people when their actions are consistent with organizational goals.  They minimize 
voluntary turnover by (a) carefully selecting employees and offering candidates realistic job 
previews and (b) providing better than average pay.  They avoid layoffs at all costs.  Finally, 
HROs rarely use contract or outsourced employees because their systems are too complicated, 
integrated, and volatile to leave reliability-oriented workforce behaviors under the influence of 
any other organization.   
 
Conceptually Assessing Fit 
Are these six principles likely to foster ROEBs in a mutually reinforcing way?  Clearly, 
this is a crucial question.  But, before we take it up, it is important to point out a few caveats.  
First, testing for vertical fit is ultimately an empirical task.  Second, demonstrating that a REHRS 
synergistically drives ROEBs is a meaningless exercise unless a valid relationship exists 
between the ROEBs and organizational reliability.  Finally, this analysis is meant only to suggest 
that the underlying reasoning behind our six REHRS principle choices is sound, after all they 
were developed with vertical and horizontal fit in mind.   
Vertical fit.  A preliminary case for vertical fit can be made by showing that each 
REHRS principle is necessary, and that collectively they are sufficient, to foster ROEBs.  That 
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is, by logically demonstrating that each ROEB is supported by at least one REHRS principle and 
that each REHRS principle addresses at least one ROEB.  As Table 1 shows, the six REHRS 
principles collectively meet this test: each ROEB is supported by a minimum of four REHRS 
principles and each REHRS principle addresses at least four of the ROEBs.  Collectively these 
REHRS principles promote focus (embed an obsession for reliability), line of sight (promote 
contextual clarity), discretion (foster reconfigurability), discipline (instill accountability), 
competence (facilitate development), and safety (encourage security).  Thus, the REHRS 
principles identified here are likely to engender employees that ascertain, communicate, initiate, 
deploy, coact, improvise, learn, and educate.   
 
Table 2 
 
Assessing Vertical Fit 
 
Organizing 
Principle 
Diligent 
Ascertain and 
communicate 
Facile 
Initiate and deploy 
Fluid 
Coact and improvise 
Generative 
Learn and Educate 
Embed an 
obsession for 
reliability 
Reinforces the 
need for 
diligence 
Reinforces the need to 
take rapid and 
appropriate action 
Reinforces the need for 
effective joint effort 
Reinforces the need 
to nurture collective 
intelligence 
Promote 
contextual 
clarity 
Provides the 
understanding 
necessary to 
anticipate and 
detect 
surprises 
Provides understanding 
of how and when to take 
action and how such 
decisions contribute to 
reliability 
Guides joint efforts and 
provides understanding 
of how collective action 
fosters reliability  
Provides insights into 
areas for future 
development 
Foster 
reconfigurability  
Provides the resources 
and skills necessary to 
take action 
Nurtures these 
behaviors and facilitates 
the movement of 
resources to where they 
can best be employed 
 
Instill 
accountability 
Reinforces the 
need for 
diligence 
 Shapes and directs joint action  
Facilitate 
development 
Provides 
essential 
competencies 
Provides essential 
competencies 
Provides multiple 
competencies 
Provides mechanisms 
for individual and 
collective learning 
Encourage 
security 
Reinforces 
open and 
honest 
communication 
Provides collective 
experience necessary to 
know when and how to 
take action 
Provides a sense of 
collegiality and 
familiarity 
Promotes real 
dialogue about areas 
for individual and 
collective growth 
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Horizontal fit.  A preliminary case for horizontal fit, in turn, can be made by showing that 
each REHRS principle is supported by multiple policies, programs, and practices and that each 
policy, program, and practice addresses multiple REHRS principles.  As Table 2 suggests, the 
26 REHRS policies, programs, and practices meet this twin test.  Each REHRS principle is 
comprised of at least four policies, programs and practices and each policy, program, and 
practice addresses at least two REHRS principles.  One can also estimate complementarity 
among REHRS policies, programs, and principles by judging whether doing more (or less) of 
any one of them would increase (decrease) the returns of doing the others.  In both cases, it 
appears as though the policies, programs, and practices that comprise a REHRS are mutually 
reinforcing and constitute a synergistic organizing system. 
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Table 3 
 
Assessing Horizontal Fit 
 
REHRS-related policies, programs, and practices Embed an obsession for reliability 
Promote 
contextual clarity 
Foster 
reconfigurability 
Instill 
accountability 
Facilitate 
development 
Encourage 
security 
Entrench reliability into organizational mission, values, and 
performance metrics +      + + + +
Insure that virtually all communication reinforces some aspect 
of reliability  +      + + + +
Reward and celebrate reliability way over and way above 
productivity or efficiency +      + +
Select and promote people on the basis of their adherence to 
organizational mission and values +      + + +
Provide employees with lots of real-time operating 
information +      + +
Develop early warning systems + + +    
Employ communication protocols + + + +  + 
Train employees continuously in the physical and dynamic 
properties of the system +      + + + +
Design (often alternate) contingency structures +  + +   
Develop guidelines that specify when and how people should 
shut down the system, deploy additional resources, 
and/or trigger the alteration of structures 
      + + +
Underspecify and overstaff critical roles + + +  +  
Push decision-making authority down to the lowest possible 
levels       + + + + +
Embed redundancy in the form of duplication and backups. + + + +  + 
Create clear lines of responsibility + + + +   
Practice zero-tolerance for actions that compromise reliability 
or impair collective action +      + +
Implement a frequent and thorough performance 
management system +      + + +
Regularly assess core processes and procedures +  +  +  
Vigilant about using “incident review” processes +   + + + 
Provide employees with lots of opportunities for new training, 
retraining, and cross training       + + +
Create communities of practice + +   +  
Reward people for raising concerns and pointing out errors. + + + +  + 
Select employees carefully and thoroughly +     + 
Offer candidates realistic job previews  +    + 
Provide better than average pay     + + 
Avoid layoffs at all costs     + + 
Eschew the use of contract or outsourced employees +  + + + + 
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In sum, then, after considering HPHRS research, we used prior HRO and SHRM 
thinking to identify a system-driven, principle-based REHRS comprised of specific 
organizational infrastructure features and human resource management activities.  Then, we 
conceptually assessed the REHRS principles on the basis of their collective capacity to support 
vertical and horizontal fit.  Based on these analyses, it can be argued that:   
Proposition 3: The REHRS will be positively related to reliability-oriented 
employee behaviors.  The more an organization forges an obsession for 
reliability, promotes contextual clarity, fosters reconfigurability, instills 
accountability, facilitates development, and encourages security, the more 
diligent, facile, fluid, and generative its employees. 
According to the behavioral approach, human resource strategy (and thus organizational 
infrastructure and human resource management activities) does not play a direct role in 
anticipating or detecting surprises, switching from stable and routine activity to flexible and novel 
action, operating effectively in chaotic situations, and continuously improving over time -- the 
core capabilities associated with organizational reliability.  Instead, it facilitates employee’s 
taking appropriate action to accomplish these critical tasks.  Thus, ROEBs should mediate the 
effects of a REHRS on organizational reliability.   
Proposition 4: Reliability-oriented employee behavior mediates between 
REHRS and organizational reliability.  
 
Conclusion 
The SHRM literature presently emphasizes a single human resource strategy -- the 
HPHRS.  This is not unreasonable given the number of studies suggesting that firms that 
selectively hire new personnel, offer comparatively high compensation contingent on 
organizational performance, provide extensive training, and so forth tend to outperform firms 
that do not.  But, before it can be concluded that a general HPHRS is preferable regardless of 
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organizational goals, contexts, or organizing systems, it is necessary to delve deeper into the 
so-called “black box” that exists between human resource activities on the one hand, and 
organizational effectiveness on the other (Becker & Gerhart, 1996).  SHRM theory is based, to a 
large extent, on the assumption that certain organizational goals require certain employee 
behaviors and that certain human resource strategies produce certain employee behaviors 
(Cappelli & Singh, 1992; Schuler & Jackson, 1987).  Yet, the literature lacks detailed examples 
of such behavioral approaches.  In this article, we begin to address this gap by presenting a 
behavioral SHRM model of HRO performance.   
How do people contribute to organizational reliability?  Prior HRO theory and research 
suggests that reliability is fostered to the extent that people ascertain and communicate to 
anticipate and detect a large number and variety of problems and surprises; initiate and deploy 
to execute substitute structures and processes that facilitate the bringing of problems under 
control; coact and improvise to face down emergencies in new and novel ways; and learn and 
educate to continually become more diligent, more facile, and more fluid over time.  These eight 
ROEBs are clearly organizational goal specific.  Thus, they should be more valuable for 
organizations focused on reliability than for organizations pursuing other performance 
outcomes.  Further, they should explain variance in reliability that general behaviors such as 
pro-social, citizenship, and turnover do not.    
How context specific are ROEBs?  The HRO literature focuses on organizations that 
operate under trying conditions, i.e., those that manage complex and interdependent systems 
subject to substantial external volatility.  Thus, the ROEBs we extract from HRO theory and 
research are highly context specific.  A common theme in the HRO literature is that the systems 
(and, thus, presumably employee contributions) that enhance reliability in relatively simple, 
straightforward, and stable environments are unlikely to be effective rapidly changing and 
unpredictable ones (Weick et. al., 1999; Weick & Roberts, 1993; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001).  In 
stable environments, reliability is achieved through foolproof and resilient structures, 
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technologies, and processes.  But, such systems are failure prone in trying circumstances.  
Instead, trying conditions require systems capable of continuously remaining one step ahead of 
actual or potential problems, errors, and surprises; systems that are continually and 
concurrently diligent, facile, fluid, and generative.  Of course this type of organizational 
ambidexterity is exceedingly difficult to achieve (Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996: Wright & Snell, 
1998).  Thus, it should not come as a surprise that scholars increasingly suggest that HROs are 
a good place in which to study new organizational forms (Bigley & Roberts, 2001; Weick et. al., 
1999) or that the behaviors identified here closely resemble those thought to enhance 
organizational agility (Dyer & Shafer, 1999, 2003).  In any case, our analysis suggests that 
desirable behaviors are likely to be both organizational goal and context specific and that SHRM 
theory and research would benefit more from deeper and richer explorations into the settings 
and circumstances in which certain employee behaviors enhance certain types of organizational 
performance.   
What human resource strategy facilitates the manifestation of ROEBS?  Consistent with 
the HPWS stream of HPHRS theory and research, we chose to develop a systems-focused, 
principle-based REHRS comprised of specific organizational infrastructure features and human 
resource management activities.  Six key REHRS principles were identified: embed an 
obsession for reliability, promote contextual clarity, foster reconfigurability, instill accountability, 
facilitate development, and encourage security. Conceptual analyses suggest that these six 
principles are individually necessary and collectively sufficient to engender ROEBs (implying 
vertical fit) and mutually reinforcing (suggesting horizontal fit) respectively.  Thus, we conclude 
that organizations that demonstrate these principles (through the infrastructure elements they 
employ and the human resource activities they utilize) are be more likely to engender ROEBs in 
their workforces than are organizations that do not.   
Is the REHRS different from the HPHRS? In one sense, the answer to this question is 
not really.  The REHRS we present here is consistent with “best practice” HPHRS findings that 
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providing employment security, selectively hiring new personnel, decentralizing decision 
making, providing extensive training, and sharing financial and performance information 
throughout the organization, enhances organizational performance (Pfeffer, 1998).  That said, 
though, the REHRS principles (and related infrastructure features and human resource 
activities) we present are highly HRO specific.  As a result, the REHRS should predict ROEBs 
better than a generic HPHRS would.  (The converse, of course, is also true: the REHRS is 
unlikely to do a good job predicting other organizational goal- and/or context-oriented employee 
behaviors.)  Thus, future research might fruitfully explore other ways in which the HPHRS can 
be tailored to other organizational goal- and/or context-specific employee behaviors.   
In another sense, though, the REHRS and HPHRS are quite different.  The REHRS is 
conceptually most similar to the HPWS stream of HPHRS theory and research in that both focus 
on a particular organizing systems, emphasize principles, and identify highly specific human 
resource activities.  But, while the HPWS was designed with flexible manufacturing systems in 
mind, the REHRS focuses on organizing systems capable of virtually problem free performance 
under the most trying of circumstances.  If these two organizing systems differ substantially (as 
HRO scholars suggest), then it clearly follows that their performance-enhancing human 
resources strategies should as well.  Future research, then, should continue working to uncover 
the human resource strategies that organizations use to develop and sustain new forms of 
organizing.   
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